

Urszula Lisowska
University of Wrocław, Poland
u_lisowska@wp.pl

How to Taste Diversity – on Discerning and Defining Capabilities¹

I Introduction – capabilities, diversity, rationality

Diversity is a motif inherently built into the capability approach at several levels. The basic tenets of this perspective involve the recognition of the diversity of human abilities to translate resources into functioning, as well as of the plurality and non-commensurability of reasonably valued goods (this assumption being reflected in the other name of the paradigm, i.e. *capabilities* approach²), and, not the least importantly, of the multiplicity of equally acceptable schemes of pursuing these various items. Depending on its specificity, each of the many spheres in which the approach is applied develops this foundational idea by means of different methodological tools. Statistics, quantitative and qualitative methods, empirical data collection, etc. – all these measures are employed in order to account for the diversity in various areas of capability research. However, this paper is not strictly concerned with such empirically oriented analyses. My intention, instead, is to focus on the philosophical underpinnings of the approach provided by one of its major representatives in philosophy, i.e. Martha Nussbaum. Drawing on Nussbaum's philosophical work at large, I will argue that her project may be seen as offering a useful conceptual framework to tackle the issue of diversity.

It has to be underlined, though, that, when confronted with the challenge of plurality, Nussbaum's conception might seem both promising and problematic. This is to do with Nussbaum's – often criticised – insistence on defining the list of priority capabilities. Its opponents argue that the catalogue is not diversity-sensitive enough since any definite content, no matter how general, always poses the risk of excluding potentially legitimate claims³. Contrary to this charge,

¹ The paper is a part of the project funded by the National Science Centre (Poland), based on the decision number DEC-2013/09/N/HS1/02864.

² Throughout the paper I use the term “*capability* approach” in a general sense, to refer to the paradigm based on the concept of “a capability”. Given Nussbaum's insistence on defining central capabilities, I reserve the term “*capabilities* approach” for her project.

³ See, for example, Thom Brooks (“The Capabilities Approach and Political Liberalism”, [in:] T. Brooks, M. C. Nussbaum [eds.], *Rawls's »Political Liberalism«*, pp. 139-173) and Sabina Alkire (*Valuing Freedoms. Sen's Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York 2002, pp. 32-41) for the criticisms of Nussbaum's list and Elisabeth Anderson (“What Is the Point of Equality”, *Ethics*, Vol. 109, No. 2, pp. 287-337) and Ingrid Robeyns (“Sen's Capability Approach and Gender Inequality: Selecting Relevant Capabilities”,

my idea is rather that Nussbaum is able to address the issue of plurality precisely due to the richer philosophical background reflected by her capabilities catalogue. This is because the list is complemented by a model of practical rationality which takes the issue of diversity seriously. I will argue that, thanks to this account, Nussbaum's project offers a methodological tool for developing the theme of diversity within the capability approach.

This is not to say, however, that the reservations of Nussbaum's opponents are entirely invalid. There do indeed seem to exist certain tensions between Nussbaum's commitment to the list and her sensitivity to pluralism. My objective will be to demonstrate that Nussbaum's project provides resources for overcoming these apparent contradictions. However, in order to discover this potential, I will have to, firstly, reason against Nussbaum, as it were. Namely, I will bring together two different elements of Nussbaum's work, which she herself prefers to keep separate – her early ethical writings⁴ and her recent work on moral psychology⁵. I will argue that, when taken in conjunction, these two elements comprise a model of reasoning capable of accounting for pluralism. Secondly, in order to demonstrate the coherence of this conception, I will extend the interpretational context quite beyond the capability approach and introduce Immanuel Kant's idea of the judgment of taste, and in particular – its elaboration developed by Hannah Arendt⁶. I will argue that this theoretical construct provides a vantage point which, when applied to Nussbaum's work, will enable me to capture its integrity and potential with regard to the diversity-sensitive model of rationality.

Therefore, the intention of the paper is primarily conceptual. I will focus on a possible philosophical approach to the issue of diversity *compatible with* (even if not directly applying) the basic tenets of the capability paradigm. Moreover, the reference to Kant's idea of taste, i.e. the judgment about beauty, means that an important part of the analysis will concern the aesthetic motifs in Nussbaum's philosophy.

[in:] I. Robeyns [et al., eds.], *Amartya Sen's work and ideas: a gender perspective*, Routledge, London, New York 2005, pp. 63–94) for different, more procedural, attempts at defining priority capabilities.

⁴ See: M.C. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness. Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press: New York 2009 (1986) and the collection of essays, *Love's Knowledge. Essays on Philosophy and Literature*, Oxford University Press: Oxford 1992 (1990).

⁵ Nussbaum drafted the foundations of her moral psychology in *Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions*, Cambridge University Press: New York 2008 (2001) and developed it in *Political Emotions, Why Love Matters for Justice [PE]*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England 2013.

⁶ See: H. Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, edited by R. Beiner, The University of Chicago Press: Chicago 1992.

Rationality and dimensions of diversity

I would like to begin by sketching the correlation between the problem of diversity and the search for a proper model of rationality. I have already mentioned three dimensions of diversity which the capability approach recognises – the diversity of conversion factors (which determine the real scope of our possibilities), of reasonably valued items (expressed in the language of capabilities), and of individual arrangements of these values. When introducing the notion of capability into contemporary debates about justice, Sen famously presented it as a convincing answer to the question: “Equality of what?”. The significance of this question, he argued in turn, stems from our conviction that, to be legitimate, any social arrangement has to presume equal consideration for each of the many involved parties. In other words, the call for equality is primarily the call for justifiability in view of diverse competing claims and perspectives⁷. Thus, if the capability approach is to function as an element of a pluralism-sensitive method of assessing socio-political reality, it has to provide a model of reasoning which will allow for such justification.

This issue is particularly emphasised in a joint paper by Sen and Nussbaum, *Internal Criticism*⁸. Here we can find yet another dimension of the concern for diversity. At the same time, this aspect refers to those mentioned so far and in this sense may be seen as the most central of them. In *Internal Criticism* Sen and Nussbaum take up the question of the inner dynamics and plurality of traditions, analysed on the example of the Indian culture. The intention of the paper is, thus, to demonstrate that changes in a given tradition need not be the effect of external pressure. Rather, each community is in constant motion and involves critical dialogue between its diverse elements⁹. In this sense, the idea of internal criticism recognises the plurality of goods and schemes of goods within one tradition and concludes that it is possible to critically reflect about a community, while (but also – on the condition of) being immersed in it. The other side of this assumption is the characteristic universalism of the capability approach. For it is believed that, given the inherent changeability and complexity of cultures, communities are porous and communication between them is possible. The capability framework is to serve as a transcultural language which yields empowering and critical tools for different traditions. And yet, to be a legitimate form of such

⁷ A. Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*, Russell Sage Foundation: New York, Clarendon Press: Oxford 1992, pp. 16-19.

⁸ M. Nussbaum, A. Sen, “Internal Criticism and Indian Rationalist Traditions”, WIDER Working Paper, WP 30 1987 (<https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/WP30.pdf>. Assessed: June 5 2016).

⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 9-13.

communication, the capability approach has to be sensitive to the specificity of diverse traditions. In other words, it has to leave enough space for both criticism and immersion¹⁰.

The argument of Sen and Nussbaum's paper is essentially that meeting these challenges requires defining a proper model of rationality, capable of functioning as a framework for internal criticism. However, although the article is of joint authorship, the solution which it offers is clearly Nussbaum's contribution. For it relies on the Aristotelian conception of practical reasoning¹¹ which Nussbaum was defending at the time and which constitutes the common point between her early ethical inquiries and the first version of her capabilities approach. This Aristotelian account will be one of the main focal points of my analysis. It is the crucial element of what I would like to defend as Nussbaum's diversity-sensitive model rationality.

But before I present it in greater detail, let me first summarise the challenges which different dimensions of diversity pose to rationality. Firstly, given the plurality of conversion factors, a convincing conception of rationality has to account for human dependence on many external elements. In other words, it has to recognise the "ethical relevance" of such factors, i.e. their relevance to our ability to act on the values that we cherish. Secondly, it should allow for the diversity of goods which people reasonably pursue. Thus, we need a type of rationality that will do justice to the complexity of normative commitments which we face on any occasion of decision-making. Thirdly, a desired model of rationality needs to have respect for the pluralism of worldviews built into it. This, in turn, means that rationality cannot simply be *a method of reasoning*, but also has to express a type of *an attitude*. Finally, and somewhat most generally, it has to offer the right balance between criticism and immersion. Only on this condition will it be able to both grasp the diversity of claims and perspectives, and assess their respective validity.

Non-scientific rationality

I have suggested that what Nussbaum describes as "an Aristotelian conception of rationality" is the common ground between her early inquiries about capabilities and the method of ethics. She designs the first version of her capabilities catalogue as an "internally essentialist" account of the

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 15.

¹¹ Ibidem, pp. 13-29.

human good defined by means of the Aristotelian procedure¹². This she more fully develops in her ethical works. Therefore, even though Nussbaum does not directly refer to the capabilities approach in her strictly ethical writings, there is good reason to assume that these two aspects of her project are related. Apart from that, Nussbaum insists that her model pertains to both private and public rationality¹³; and yet more importantly, I will argue that the crucial features of this account do, in fact, correspond to her capabilities approach.

Nussbaum presents the Aristotelian conception as a critical response to the Platonic model of ethics. However, the way she construes it, this polemic is not merely historical. Rather, the Plato-Aristotle controversy stands for the perennial debate between two different approaches to ethics – the attempts to model practical rationality after scientific knowledge (*episteme*, *techne*¹⁴), on the one hand, and a more modest, common-sense attitude, on the other. Nussbaum sees Aristotle as the founder of the non-scientific camp, whose contemporary adversaries include utilitarianism and Kantianism, as well as those ethical conceptions which seek comprehensive justification for morality in natural sciences (e.g. evolutionary ethics). In other words, Nussbaum's Aristotelianism is designed as an alternative to the many forms of technocratic thinking, which claim to unflinchingly deduce practical conclusions from universal rules¹⁵. Clearly, then, this debate is relevant to development economics as well. Nussbaum's opposition to the dictate of scientific reasoning matches the quest against reductionist approaches to well-being, which defines the capability approach¹⁶. Thus, Nussbaum's ethical and political interests converge already at this basic level.

On Nussbaum's interpretation, the essence of the Aristotelian method consists in dealing with the so-called *phainomena*, or appearances (from *phainesthai* – 'to appear'). Practical rationality does not reach out to things as they *are in themselves* in order to derive ethical precepts from the

¹² See, for example, M.C. Nussbaum, "Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism" [HF], *Political Theory*, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 202-246, "Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach", [in:] M. C. Nussbaum, A. Sen (eds.), *The Quality of Life*, Clarendon Press: Oxford 1993, pp. 242-269.

¹³ Eadem, "The Discernment Rests with Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of Private and Public Rationality", [in:] M. C. Nussbaum, *Love's Knowledge*, pp. 97-104.

¹⁴ Following Aristotle's distinction between *episteme*-scientific knowledge and *techne*-craft, the contemporary scholarship usually treats these two Greek terms separately. However, Nussbaum argues that this conceptual distinction did not exist in Plato's times and even Aristotle did not always observe it (M. C. Nussbaum, *Fragility*, pp. 94-99). This is because *episteme* and *techne* do indeed have a lot in common in that they are both interested in unflinching rules. It could even be said that *techne* – as the activity based on repeatable and certain procedures – is the counterpart of *episteme* in the world of practice. See also: footnote no. 39 for Arendt's remarks about *techne* and *poiesis*.

¹⁵ See, for example, *ibidem*, pp. 290-317.

¹⁶ See, for example, A. Sen, "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory", *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 317-344.

metaphysical structure of reality (metaphysical nature of human beings, objective order of entities, etc.). Instead, it focuses on the way things *appear to us* – on our own common-sense (i.e. shared) evaluative beliefs¹⁷. It is in this sense that Nussbaum's early capabilities list is internally essentialist, presenting *human ideas* about the *human good*¹⁸. Obviously, this does not mean that appearances can be simply accepted at face value. Quite to the contrary, they have to be systematised and clarified in the procedure which resembles John Rawls' (and also Aristotle-inspired) method of reflective equilibrium. In that it involves the constant move between general principles and specific judgments in the attempt at bringing them into coherence, this model does justice to our common-sense beliefs, while at the same time imposing certain rigour on them¹⁹.

Equilibrium-seeking is, however, only 'a skeleton' which can be filled with various types of content. Nussbaum's understanding of the Aristotelian rationality involves both this general procedure and specific assumptions as to its objects²⁰. Here, again, the notion of appearances proves instructive. For this what appears to us, is, in turn, *perceived* by us – its recipients. Indeed, based on Nussbaum's ethical essays, perception (*aesthesis*) emerges as the core of her Aristotelian method²¹. This faculty of keen comprehension is responsible for both yielding appearances, and their systematisation, following four assumptions in the process. It recognises, firstly, the plurality and non-commensurability of values and, secondly, the priority of particular situations in which we are presented with various configurations and examples of these goods. General rules are necessary as well, but they should be used flexibly so as to fit the specificity of the context²². In order to succeed in such attentive application of the rules, perception, thirdly, employs the intelligent interpretative faculties of emotions and imagination. Finally, it takes into account the

¹⁷ See, for example, M.C. Nussbaum, *Fragility*, pp. 240-263.

¹⁸ See, for example, eadem, *HF* and "Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics" [*HN*], [in:] J.E.J. Altham and R. Harrison (eds.), *World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams*, Cambridge University Press, 1999 (1995), pp. 86-131.

¹⁹ Eadem, "Perceptive Equilibrium: Literary Theory and Ethical Theory", [in:] *Love's Knowledge*, pp. 172-174. See also: J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice [TJ]*, Revised Edition, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts 1999 (1971), p. 18.

²⁰ M.C. Nussbaum, "Introduction: Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature", [in:] *Love's Knowledge*, pp. 26-28.

²¹ Eadem, "Discernment", pp. 54-55, 82-84, *Fragility*, pp. 305-309 and "Perceptive Equilibrium", pp. 168-194.

²² To explain the status of general principles, Nussbaum refers to Aristotle's famous "Lesbian rule" example. Like this type of a measure used on the Greek island of Lesbos, rules should "bend" to the shape of the case at hand, so as to, both, capture its specificity and provide some universal standard of its assessment (eadem, "Discernment", pp. 70-72).

“ethical relevance of uncontrolled happenings”²³, acknowledging the ever-changing, unpredictable nature of the realm of acting²⁴.

It could, thus, be said that perception is the ability to respond to the case at hand by attending to its particularity and complexity. Our common-sense beliefs, appearances, are the summarises of such experiences. Things appear to us the way we perceive them, interpreting reality by means of emotions and imagination, as well as by the flexible use of principles. The systematisation of appearances, in turn, takes places whenever we formulate a concrete judgment. For each practical decision requires achieving the right balance between our current perceptions and what we have come to believe prior to that.

Perception and diversity

This, in a nutshell, is Nussbaum’s Aristotelian conception of rationality founded on attentive perception. It is worth observing that perception emerges as a method of, both, applying and defining a conception of the good. This is because, although each particular decision is rooted in our previous understanding of the good expressed by certain general precepts, it can also lead to their reformulation (for example, a specific judgment concerning duties towards a friend can influence our idea of friendship at large). We need to ask, then, whether this method is compatible with an account of the good formulated in the language of capabilities.

a) Conversion factors and non-commensurability

This question amounts to assessing whether Nussbaum’s model meets the challenges related to diversity. For only on this condition will it be a convincing conception of rationality, which, as I have argued, is necessary to complement the capability framework with its commitment to plurality. Let me, then, confront it with the criteria named above. Clearly, Nussbaum’s account allows for the multiplicity of elements which define the scope of our possibilities. The insistence on the ethical relevance of uncontrolled events corresponds to the idea of conversion factors characteristic of the capability approach. Moreover, the opposition to ‘scientific’ reductionism, most emphatically expressed in the assumptions of non-commensurability and priority of the particulars, speaks of the qualitative character of Nussbaum’s model. Therefore, and in line with

²³ Eadem, “Form and Content”, p. 43.

²⁴ Ibidem, pp. 36-44, eadem, “Discernment”, pp. 56-82.

the capability framework, her conception of rationality can be a tool of the nuanced reflection on well-being, which extends way beyond the limitations of purely quantitative thinking²⁵.

b) Immersion versus criticism

However, the remaining two dimensions of diversity seem to pose more difficulty to Nussbaum's project. On the one hand, her conception may come across as too detached to allow for the actual immersion in the perceived reality so as to facilitate a genuinely respectful attitude to the pluralism inherent in it. For the very term 'perception' suggests spectatorship – keen, yet distanced observation rather than involvement. Admittedly, perception employs emotions, “but its feelings are the feelings of the friend”²⁶; it cools down the most visceral passions and strives for the clarity of vision²⁷. Therefore, it could be argued that perception does not leave space for the enthusiastic acknowledgment of another person's right to differ. As a result, perception at times seems to represent the perspective of an outsider – a very observant one, but an outsider nonetheless. This, in turn, makes its potential for immersion problematic.

On the other hand, and paradoxically enough, perception could also be accused of not being sufficiently critical. This charge is related to the very specificity of this model as a development of the broader Aristotelian scheme of equilibrium-seeking. For, although perception is its possible appropriation, it by no means necessarily follows from this general framework. It is legitimate to ask, then, where do Nussbaum's assumptions come from? My idea is that the Aristotelian conception of perception-based rationality corresponds to Nussbaum's Aristotelian conception of the human being (or – of the person)²⁸, which underlies her entire philosophical project²⁹. The idea

²⁵ See: Eadem, *Poetic Justice. The Literary Imagination and Public Life* (Beacon Press: Boston 1995) for the most poignant polemic with reductionist, qualitative thinking.

²⁶ Eadem, “Perceptive Equilibrium”, p. 189.

²⁷ Ibidem, pp. 187-190.

²⁸ The notion of ‘the person’ appeared in Nussbaum's work with her declared transition to political liberalism (see below; compare also Nussbaum's earlier preference for the notion of ‘the human being’, eadem, *HF*, pp. 226-227). However, I will argue that the revised version of her project still hinges on her Aristotelian account of the human being. Hence, it seems that in the case of Nussbaum's project, the categories of ‘the person’ and ‘the human being’ can be used interchangeably.

²⁹ Rawls' idea of reflective equilibrium is an example of another appropriation of the Aristotelian framework. Nussbaum herself underlines that, in spite of many common points, her conception differs from Rawls' model. This is because Rawls' procedure rests on fixed beliefs, which differ only in terms of generality. Nussbaum's account, in turn, is more dynamic and concerns also the process of *formulating* judgments, rather than just the systematisation of those beliefs which already constitute our common-sense knowledge (eadem, “Perceptive Equilibrium”, pp. 174-176, 182-183). It could be argued that these differences, at least partly, reflect differences in the conceptions of the person which Nussbaum and Rawls, respectively, adopt. Rawls' Kantian (‘Kantian’ in the sense of Kant's ethics and not aesthetics, which I present below) privileges a narrower understanding of rationality, committed to more rigorous methodological

of humans as rational political animals – intelligent and dignified, but also needy and dependent in their very ability to live a worthy life – constitutes a common thread in Nussbaum’s work, from her ethical writings on “the fragility of goodness”, through the early texts on capabilities, to her more recent research on the deficiencies of the social contract tradition³⁰ and animality-rejecting emotions³¹. Perception is the type of rationality compatible with the human condition thus understood. When we follow this method, we allow for the limitations of our cognition, our dependency on external factors, the social dimension of ethical reflection, and the multiplicity of values relevant to the good of such composite creatures that we are. Thus, Nussbaum’s model of rationality seems to be a part of the larger picture of the human condition.

In what sense may such specificity go against the critical potential of Nussbaum’s conception and, consequently, undermine its compliance with the challenges of diversity? This is to do with the circularity involved in the account drafted above. For, on the one hand, the model of perception-based rationality is correct, because it is congruent with our understanding of the human condition. On the other hand, the latter is specified in the process of the perceptive systematisation of sharable appearances. Nussbaum herself does seem to acknowledge this type of circularity³² and reject the search for the “Archimedean point” in ethics, i.e. the external, objective approach to our evaluative beliefs³³. Rather than provide the Aristotelian conception with an independent basis, Nussbaum’s account of rationality is to serve as a tool for its clarification and systematisation. This, however, can raise doubts concerning diversity. It could be objected that Nussbaum’s model is exclusive towards other accounts of the human condition and related approaches to ethical reflection. This, in turn, would make its respectfulness towards diverse schemes of goods problematic. Embedded as it is in a distinct set of philosophical assumptions (general though those may be), Nussbaum’s conception may appear to unduly limit the space of critical reflection.

requirements. See also footnote no. 66 for a related controversy about ‘reasonability’. When it comes to Nussbaum’s polemic with Rawls’ conception of the person – see: eadem, *Frontiers of Justice Disability, Nationality, Species Membership*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England 2007 (2006).

³⁰ Eadem, *Frontiers*.

³¹ Eadem, *PE*, eadem, *Hiding from Humanity. Disgust, Shame, and the Law*, Princeton University Press: Princeton 2004.

³² Eadem, *Fragility*, pp. 309-312.

³³ The term “Archimedean point” was used in this context by Bernard Williams, who accused Aristotle of committing this fallacy (B. Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, Routledge: London and New York 2006 [1985], pp. 22-53). However, in *HN* Nussbaum undermined Williams’ assessment of Aristotle and offered her own, “internally essentialist” interpretation, instead.

c) A claim to political liberalism

Here we touch the signalised divide in Nussbaum's work. For, as I have suggested, Nussbaum prefers not to include her ethical considerations into her more recent work. This is related to her attempts at reformulating her capabilities approach in the language of political liberalism (as it was defined by John Rawls and Charles Larmore³⁴). Such transition primarily entails the search for a new model of justification, which would enable Nussbaum to explicate her Aristotelian assumptions without exclusively referring to this particular ("comprehensive") philosophical background³⁵. A thorough analysis of Nussbaum's claim to political liberalism exceeds the limits of this paper. However, I will argue that Nussbaum's reliance on the Aristotelian account of the human being is also decisive for her more recent research (which does seem to undermine her politico-liberal aspirations³⁶). In the following part of the paper I will focus on one aspect which exemplifies the continuity of Nussbaum's philosophical work. Namely, I will argue that the latest addition to Nussbaum's project, related to her interest in political liberalism, i.e. her moral psychology, is complementary to the idea of perception. Together these two comprise a model of practical rationality capable of overcoming the two possible threats to the two dimensions of diversity. Thus, on the one hand, they jointly constitute a type of rationality immersed enough to involve a respectful attitude to plurality and present an insider view of a community. On the other hand, their combination provides enough space for difference and criticism.

It is at this point that I would like to introduce the additional philosophical context mentioned at the very beginning. As I have suggested, it seems fruitful to supply Nussbaum's project with Arendt's interpretation of Kant's concept of taste. This is not to say that I intend to present a comprehensive synthesis of these two (or even three, inasmuch as Arendt employs Kant's category for her own purposes), in many respects very different, traditions. Rather, I will argue that Arendt's use of the Kantian category involves elements similar to those two aspects that constitute

³⁴ J. Rawls, *Political Liberalism [PL]*, Columbia University Press: New York 1993, 1996, Ch. Larmore, *The Morals of Modernity*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2003 (1996), Ch. Larmore, *Patterns of Moral Complexity*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, Melbourne, Sydney 2001 (1987).

³⁵ When it comes to Nussbaum's claim to political liberalism – see, for example: M.C. Nussbaum, "Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2011, pp. 3-45 and "Political Liberalism and Respect", *Sats – Nordic Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2003, pp. 25-44.

³⁶ See: J. M. Alexander, "Social justice and Nussbaum's conception of the person", [in:] F. Comim, M.C. Nussbaum (eds.), *Capabilities, Gender, Equality. Towards Fundamental Entitlements*, Cambridge University Press 2014, pp. 414-436. Compare also F. Comim's paper in the same volume ("Building capabilities: a new paradigm for human development", *ibidem*, pp. 129-154), where the author classifies Nussbaum's project as "partially comprehensive".

Nussbaum's conception of practical rationality. For this reason, it can be treated as a possible model of bringing them together.

II Judgment of taste

Arendt – judging appearances

Let me first specify the reasons which, I believe, justify the unorthodox pairing of Nussbaum and Arendt. The most obvious link concerns terminology, since the key concept of Arendt's political philosophy is that of 'the appearance'. For Arendt the fabric of political reality is the power to appear, i.e. the ability of political actors to present themselves to each other through words and deeds. Although of somewhat different specificity, this idea and Nussbaum's notion of *phainomena* have similar implications. This is because Arendt relates appearing to the unpredictability and frailty of human actions. Inasmuch as it is the realm of action, the genuinely public sphere is the space of appearance. That is: it is constituted by singular deeds – acts of freedom and individuality, which cannot be foretold beforehand and whose consequences are both potentially endless and fragile³⁷. From this it follows that reflection about human affairs cannot be subjected to fixed rules, but has to confront the ephemeral nature of this domain. The world of appearances is the realm of opinions (*doxai*) – plural, partial, contentious, and yet justifiable interpretations. Therefore, Arendt argues that it requires us to go beyond the scientific ideal of deductive knowledge and look for a different model of rationality³⁸. It is essentially in this sense that Nussbaum's commitment to appearances coincides with that of Arendt's. Both authors question the exclusive validity of purely deductive reasoning and set out to define a different account, which would do justice to the diversity inherent in the realm of human affairs³⁹.

In Arendt's case, this objective is reflected by her preoccupation with the issue of judgment, which, roughly speaking, emerges as the faculty responsible for formulating opinions. When it comes to the details of Arendt's approach, however, the rich scholarship to date emphasises many

³⁷ H. Arendt, *The Human Condition [HC]*, Second Edition, The University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London 1988 (1958), pp. 175-207.

³⁸ Eadem, *On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts about Lessing*, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company and Georges Borchardt Inc. 1996 (1968) (<https://signale.cornell.edu/text/humanity-dark-times-thoughts-about-lessing>. Assessed: July 6 2016). See also: P. Hansen, *Hannah Arendt. Politics, History and Citizenship*, Polity Press: Cambridge 1993, pp. 61-62.

³⁹ Arendt's distinction between making (*poiesis*), governed by the repeatable rules of *techne*, and spontaneous doing, and the focus on the latter (H. Arendt, *HC*, pp. 118-126, 207-212, D.R. Villa, *Politics, Philosophy, Terror*, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey 1999, pp. 93-95), correspond to Nussbaum's criticism of ethics based on *techne* or *episteme*. Thus, Arendt's opposition to the scientific reasoning about political reality stems from her understanding of the latter.

problematic points. One of the most intensely discussed questions involves the apparent tension between Arendt's earlier idea of judgment, related to the perspective of *vita activa* drafted in *The Human Condition*, and her later considerations, which were supposed to culminate in the last, unfinished volume of *The Life of Mind* and seem to gravitate towards the model of *vita contemplativa*. It will be noticed that this opposition resembles the "immersion versus criticism" dilemma present in Nussbaum's conception. For the basic issue is whether judgment should be conceived as a capability of active participants in political reality (*act-ors*), or rather – as a privilege of distanced, impartial spectators⁴⁰.

I do not intend to settle these highly complex debates about Arendt's legacy. However, my idea is that her posthumous *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, in which Arendt focuses on Kant's idea of taste, seem to suggest a balanced account of the many aspects of judging. Regardless of whether this model fully represents either Arendt's or Kant's theories of judgment, it is convincing and nuanced. Yet more importantly, it is relevant to the difficulty that Nussbaum's conception seems to be facing.

Kant – judgment of taste

The notion of judgment occupies a special place in Kant's philosophical system. The subject of the third and last of his *Critiques*, it was designed to combine the other two parts of his system – i.e. practical and theoretical reasoning⁴¹. Its primary task was to explain how it is possible to act freely and intentionally in the world determined by regularities and events which we cannot control⁴². For this reason alone, the Kantian concept of judgment fits the framework of this paper.

a) Aesthetic reflection

However, the idea of taste as a variety of the general faculty of judging is yet more pertinent to the issue which I would like to address. For of two types of judgment which Kant distinguishes – determinant and reflective – taste belongs to the second category. This means that it does not

⁴⁰ For the interpretations which focus on the duality of Arendt's theory of judgment, see for example: M. Passerin D'Entrèves, "Arendt's Theory of Judgment", [in:] D.R. Villa (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2000, pp. 245-260, R. Beiner, "Interpretative Essay. Hannah Arendt on Judging", [in:] H. Arendt, *Lectures*, edited by R. Beiner, pp. 89-156.

⁴¹ I. Kant, "Introduction, III", [in:] idem, *The Critique of Judgment [CJ]*, transl. J.H. Bernard, Second Edition Revised, Online Library of Liberty (<http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/kant-the-critique-of-judgement>. Assessed: July 5 2016).

⁴² R. Beiner, "Interpretative Essay", pp. 118-119.

proceed from a general rule in order to subsume particulars under this principle. Instead, it confronts the particularity of the judged phenomenon and tries to find the universal dimension *within* it⁴³. This type of validity is often described as exemplary. A particular thing is perceived as a model specimen (in the case of taste – an exemplary instance of beauty), but its representative quality follows from its specific features, rather than from conformity with an abstract ideal⁴⁴. Taste is thus non-deductive and concerned with singularities, and yet, at the same time, strives for some form of universality. This specificity already suggests its relevance to the search for a non-scientific model of rationality.

On what grounds, then, can we assert that a particular object is a good example of beauty, given that this concept does not exist beyond its specimens? This is to do with the aesthetic character of taste. Kant’s understanding of “the aesthetic” is broader than the contemporary use of this term in that it refers to the subjective side of experience (*aesthesis* – perception). Taste is aesthetic, because, as a reflective judgment not bound by a priori concepts, it does not communicate any information about the object. Rather, it expresses the feeling of satisfaction which the thing judged to be beautiful evokes in the judging person⁴⁵. At the same time, precisely because of its reflectivity, it is not purely subjective. For the lack of an a priori concept behind this judgment also implies that the verdict of taste is not mediated by any practical interest which could be related to such a concept. And since the satisfaction cannot be explained by any interest that a particular admirer of beauty is currently pursuing, it has to be assumed to arise on grounds common to all potential judges⁴⁶. This foundation is, Kant argues, the free play of imagination – the power of synthesising sensual data, and intellect (or understanding) – the power of producing concepts. That is to say, the satisfaction involved in the perception of an example of beauty stems from the sense of harmony between our ability to apprehend particular phenomena and the ability to think in terms of general notions⁴⁷. Taste is aesthetic in that it postulates that a given object will evoke this type of response in any subject. In this way, it makes a claim to “subjective universality” or, to use a modern term, to intersubjectivity⁴⁸.

⁴³ I. Kant, *CJ*, “Introduction, IV”.

⁴⁴ Idem, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, transl. P. Guyer, A.W. Wood, Cambridge University Press: New York 1998, A131/B172-A136/B175, pp. 268-270, idem, *CJ*, §6-8. See also: H. Arendt, *Lectures*, pp. 77-78, R. Beiner, “Interpretative Essay”, pp. 121, 127.

⁴⁵ I. Kant, *CJ*, §1-2.

⁴⁶ Ibidem, §6.

⁴⁷ Ibidem, “Introduction, VII”, §9.

⁴⁸ Ibidem, §8-9.

The specificity of taste consists, thus, in balancing between opposing poles – particularity and universality, subjectivity and shareability. It will be noticed that these dyads could be related to the familiar “immersion versus criticism” dilemma. Taste navigates between intense preoccupation with details and the search for some sort of consensus, which requires the ability to distance oneself from the most immediate experience. Hence, it is this double nature of the judgment of taste that seems to make it most pertinent to the issue of practical rationality. The question remains, however, how such balance between apparently opposing dimensions can be achieved.

b) *Sensus communis*

In order to address this issue, it is worth noting that, as an aesthetic judgment, taste postulates certain regularities of perception. To judge an object as beautiful is to claim that it will universally evoke a particular response in perceivers. Therefore, Kant argues, taste necessarily assumes the existence of *sensus communis* – a common manner of experiencing reality⁴⁹. Given the reflective nature of taste, such commonality involves not so much a set of content-based principles and beliefs⁵⁰ as rules of justification which enable us to “ask for” the agreement of everyone else⁵¹. This is because the approval cannot be determined by concepts, but has to be ‘courted’ by the use of the proper “»mode of thought«”. Its basic maxim is what Kant describes as “enlarged thought” – the requirement that we “put ourselves in thought in the place of everyone else”⁵². That is to say, in order to claim validity for a judgment of taste as a type of *sensus communis*, we have to probe it from any other possible perspective. Only if it passes this test, will the verdict of taste be *universally communicable*, i.e. not only comprehensible, but also capable of transmitting to others the feeling of satisfaction which it expresses⁵³.

It is, I would like to argue, the idea of *sensus communis* as the necessary presupposition of taste that combines the requirements of both criticism and immersion. The critical aspect of this construction may seem more obvious. After all, the maxim of enlarged thought requires us to

⁴⁹ Ibidem, §20-21.

⁵⁰ It is worth noticing that Kant distinguishes *sensus communis* from common sense (or common understanding). According to his terminology, the latter is always based on concepts, albeit vague (ibidem, §20). However, when applying his idea of taste to Nussbaum’s project, I will not follow this distinction. For it seems that the concept of perception combines *sensus communis* with common sense, inasmuch as it forms a part of the model of communal inquiry, whose procedures allow us to define – but also: constantly redefine – a set of sharable beliefs.

⁵¹ Ibidem, §19.

⁵² Ibidem, §40.

⁵³ Ibidem, §40.

distance ourselves from our spontaneous responses and check their intersubjective validity. This is precisely what reflection in a reflective judgment does – the job of imagination is to take perceptions out of their original context and refer them to our ability to think in terms of general concepts⁵⁴.

The notion of communicability, however, suggests that this process of distancing is complemented by immersion. This is to do with the idea of sociability as the empirical interest which underlies the interest in beauty. For, although in their “pure” form, i.e. at the level of their content, judgments of taste do not express any practical purpose, the faculty to form such judgments is related to the natural social inclinations of human beings. This is because the *communication* of feelings, which happens via judgments of taste, strengthens human *community*⁵⁵. In this way, taste contributes to social bonds. We distance ourselves from the most immediate surroundings, but this we do to make our judgments more universal and, as a result, actualise human sociability.

Arendt – taste in politics

The connection to sociability points to the relevance of taste to practical reasoning. In her interpretation of Kant’s idea, Arendt develops this aspect. As I have mentioned, she phrases the criticism-immersion dialectic in terms of the relationship between a spectator and an actor. Her account of the public realm implies that the proper objects of judgment are appearances. In order to formulate an opinion (*doxa*) about political reality, we have to respond to spontaneous activities of political actors. Thus, taste, as the non-deductive faculty of judging, emerges as the correct method of such reasoning⁵⁶. At the same time, however, the element of reacting to phenomena visible in the public realm, seems to suggest that judging thus understood is essentially the job of spectators. To put it differently: we can assess political happenings inasmuch as we approach them as *the recipients* of appearances and not as those *who actually appear* to each other⁵⁷. This interpretation coincides with Arendt’s insistence on the retrospective nature of judgment. Because of the frailty and unpredictability of human actions, Arendt argues, the sense of human affairs

⁵⁴ H. Arendt, *Lectures*, pp. 66-69.

⁵⁵ I. Kant, *CJ*, §41.

⁵⁶ R. Beiner, “Interpretative Essay”, pp. 101-106.

⁵⁷ H. Arendt, *Lectures*, pp. 52-59, M. Passerin D’Entrèves, “Arendt’s Theory of Judgment”, pp. 249-252.

“reveals itself fully only to the (...) backward glance of the historian”⁵⁸. Thus, distance and disengagement emerge as the necessary preconditions of judgment.

However, rather than unequivocally prioritise spectatorship over participation, Arendt seems to treat these perspectives as interdependent. On the one hand, she suggests that actors need to be able to assume the perspective of observers while assessing their situation. This is to do with the double sense of *doxa*. Like contemporary ‘opinion’, this term can refer both to a particular *judgment* and to the state of *being judged* in a certain way. In other words, actors work for a good opinion of spectators, in that they make their acts comprehensible to viewers and ‘court’ the approval of their taste⁵⁹. This, in turn, might suggest that the perspective of a spectator is the criterion from which actors should judge their own and each other’s activities. In order to make the right decision, we have to take a step back from the political reality in which we are immersed. Enlarged thinking, the maxim of taste, is the way to achieve this necessary distance. Arguably, this detachment can never be complete. But by exposing the duality of *doxa*, Arendt builds spectatorship into the experience of participation in a form of a regulative idea, which can guide us when we strive to make a right judgment⁶⁰.

On the other hand, the viewer side of the judgment of taste cannot exist without its actor counterpart. This is not only because, in the most obvious sense, performance is the *raison d’être* of the spectator. Yet more importantly, it is through our participation in political reality that we can make sociability happen, which seems to be the inclination behind judgments of taste. Arendt argues that, if there is any “categorical imperative for action” which taste provides, it urges us to strive for *community* through the *communication* of feelings⁶¹.

But this means that *sensus communis* has to represent certain ethos, i.e. – cultivated forms of responses. Even more than in *Lectures*, this trope is present in Arendt’s observations about the contemporary crisis of judgment. Arendt argues that the demise of the public space of appearance

⁵⁸ H. Arendt, *H.C.*, p. 192.

⁵⁹ Eadem, *Lectures*, pp. 55-56. Therefore, Kant argues that taste has priority over genius. An artist should strive to make his works comprehensible to audience, that is – to please their taste. Hence: “taste gives guidance as to where and how far it [genius] may extend itself, if it is to remain purposive” (I. Kant, *CJ*, §50. See also: H. Arendt, *Lectures*, pp. 62-63).

⁶⁰ In this respect, Kant’s *sensus communis* resembles Adam Smith’s model of impartial spectator (the Third Critique and *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* were published in the same year, 1790). Among other things, this construct was to serve as the method of qualifying one’s own passions so as to make them comprehensible to a distanced, yet sympathetic judicious observer (A. Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Sixth Edition, MetaLibri: Sao Paolo 2005 [1790], pp. 11-21). For the references to Smith’s model in Nussbaum’s works – see: M. C. Nussbaum, *Poetic Justice*, pp. 72-77).

⁶¹ H. Arendt, *Lectures*, pp. 74-75.

and the advent of technocratically arranged societies resulted in thoughtlessness and intellectual passivity (most gruesomely embodied by Nazi bureaucracy). For when citizens are not confronted with each other's spontaneous activity, *sensus communis* – shared standards of mutual treatment – disappear. This effectively inhibits the faculty of judgment. Rather than function as a basic form of civic activity, it becomes a special ability of perceptive individuals⁶².

III Taste and capabilities approach

Perception and taste

On the basis of the above account, then, taste could be interpreted as the foundational concept of such a model of rationality that recognises the dialectic of immersion and criticism. When we formulate a judgment of taste, we reason as members of a community – we take interest in beauty for the sake of sociability and justify our verdicts by referring to sharable ways of responding. At the same time, this very ethos obliges us to transcend our narrow, individual perspectives and serves as the test for the validity of our opinions. A judgment of taste always involves critical distance – not only to our own unreflective responses, but also to the entrenched ways of thinking. For, rather than resort to readymade categories, taste confronts the particularity of perceived *examples*.

How, then, could this framework be applied to Nussbaum's model of perception? And, most importantly, how can it contribute to solving the problem which Nussbaum's conception seems to be facing – i.e. the challenge related to accommodating respect for diverse schemes of values within her Aristotelian project? To begin to answer this question, the similarity of Nussbaum's category to the idea of taste needs to be emphasised. There do indeed exist obvious common points between these two theoretical constructs. As the etymology suggests, like the aesthetic judgment of taste, perception (*aesthesis*) is a manner of responding to the world. It, too, deals with appearances (*phainomena*), that is – things which present themselves to our cognitive faculties. Most importantly, perception approaches these phenomena non-deductively, ready to confront their particularity. Thus, Nussbaum's insistence on non-scientificism corresponds to taste's reflective character. Although perception draws on our prior concepts and principles, like taste it is by no

⁶² In this interpretation, I follow D.R. Villa, who argues that "Arendt's overarching narrative about the destruction (...) of the public realm" constitutes the common thread and foundation of her theory of judgment (D.R. Villa, *Politics, Philosophy, Terror*, pp. 98-103). See also: H. Arendt, *HC*, pp. 280-284, where Arendt describes the destructive influence of Cartesian introspection on the idea of common sense.

means limited by them; moreover, these principles are based on particular experiences, which they systematise and summarise⁶³.

Moreover, and to add to the characteristics of perception already mentioned above, Nussbaum often directly links this method to aesthetic experience. This she does at two levels. First, she argues that, as a form of practical reasoning, perception resembles aesthetic appreciation. Perception requires the same type of attention to detail, interpretative ingenuity and openness to novelty that characterise our attitude to works of art⁶⁴. Here perception resembles the fine taste of an art connoisseur. It is, thus, the attitude of an attentive spectator – focused on the work, yet distanced. Secondly, however, Nussbaum treats perception as an artistic activity in itself. The effort of perceiving, she says, is essentially the effort of creating a proper interpretation of the situation. Although she sometimes compares it to assembling a correct picture of the context, she most often speaks of perception as of improvisation – theatrical or musical. Like improvisation, perception consists in responding to the evolving situation, which requires flexible application of rules and attentiveness to other persons involved. Taken from this angle, then, perception emerges as a method of acting. It is now the faculty of engaged participants, immersed in the world of human affairs⁶⁵.

Thus, it is in the aesthetic dimension of perception that criticism and immersion meet. For this reason, it seems apt to complement Nussbaum's project with the concept of taste. How exactly could this model be applied to Nussbaum's conception, then? Here yet another common point between perception and taste needs to be emphasised. Just as taste essentially consists in communicating feelings, so too perception strongly relies on emotions, which are its important interpretative tools. But, if perception is to function as a method of public rationality, emotions which it involves also have to be intersubjectively comprehensible. Therefore, it would seem that, like taste, perception needs to be supported by a proper ethos. That is, it can only function when

⁶³ M.C. Nussbaum, "Discernment", p. 68.

⁶⁴ Eadem, "»Finely Aware and Richly Responsible«: Literature and Moral Imagination", [in:] *Love's Knowledge*, pp. 161-162, "Discernment", p. 84. In this context Nussbaum most often refers to literature. She argues, first, that classic realist novels by Henry James or Charles Dickens aptly represent the process of perceiving (see, for example, eadem *Poetic Justice*, "Discernment", pp. 84-93). She also quotes James' theoretical texts on the connection between novel writing and moral reflection (compare: H. James, *The Art of the Novel*, Charles Scribner's Sons: New York 1937). Secondly, she suggests that the relationship between the reader and the novel provides the model for perceiving phenomena in ethics (M.C. Nussbaum, "Reading for Life", "Love's Knowledge", [in:] *Love's Knowledge*, pp. 230-244, 261-285).

⁶⁵ M.C. Nussbaum, "Literature and the Moral Imagination", pp. 162-164, "Discernment", pp. 73-74, 93-97.

there are certain shared, cultivated forms of responding. It is at this point, I would like to argue, that perception should be supplemented by Nussbaum's reasonable moral psychology.

The concept of a reasonable moral psychology

I have mentioned that Nussbaum's interest in moral psychology is related to her claims to political liberalism. Indeed, the very idea of a "reasonable moral psychology" stems from Rawls's *Political Liberalism* and is strictly connected to this project. In this context, "reasonable" could best be understood as capable of gaining approval of individuals who adopt different, yet equally acceptable schemes of goals⁶⁶. For, in order to justify any theory of justice *whatsoever*, we need to adopt an account of human moral motivation so as to demonstrate that this conception can be effectively internalised by citizens. To be stable in this sense, a *pluralism-sensitive* theory of justice has to be supplied by a moral psychology which is likewise respectful of diversity. This means that, firstly, it has to be based on shareable foundations (i.e. be "reasonable") and, secondly, that it should offer an explanation of how citizens come to respect pluralism⁶⁷.

Concern for the diversity of acceptable worldviews is, thus, central to Nussbaum's inquiries about moral psychology. It is also for this reason that she does not explicitly link this area of research to her earlier, avowedly Aristotelian model of rationality. In fact, however, both her interest in psychology and the details of her approach reflect her broader philosophical background. For, inasmuch as she argues – as she does – that the psychology of political liberalism must essentially involve an account of emotions, she implicitly refers to her prior conception of rationality⁶⁸. This connection is clearly captured in her "neo-Stoic" theory of emotions. The result of Nussbaum's studies on ancient philosophy⁶⁹, this approach combines the radical cognitivism of

⁶⁶ This is the understanding of 'reasonability' that Nussbaum favours. She notices that Rawls is generally inclined to interpret reasonability as a methodological category (J. Rawls, *PL*, pp. 58-59), but sometimes attributes ethical meaning to it, which she prefers and sees as more inclusive (M. C. Nussbaum, "Perfectionist Liberalism", pp. 22-33, eadem, "Rawls's »Political Liberalism«. A Reassessment", *Ratio Juris*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 6-11).

⁶⁷ J. Rawls, *TJ*, pp. 397-449, *PL*, pp. 86-88.

⁶⁸ It is remarkable that, whereas *A Theory of Justice* features a complex, three-stage account of moral development (J. Rawls, *TJ*, pp. 405-419), *Political Liberalism* involves only general remarks about the need to assume some form of a moral psychology. Nussbaum sees this change as a significant lack in Rawls' later work and sets out to make up for that with her conception (M. C. Nussbaum, *PE*, pp. 8-11). However, it could be argued that Rawls' omission of his earlier model of psychology is related to his evolution towards political liberalism with its striving for as modest philosophical assumptions as possible. Therefore, although Nussbaum declares that she wants to supply political liberalism with more detailed psychological foundations, this very intention might actually go against political liberalism.

⁶⁹ See: M.C. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics*, Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford 2009 (1994).

the Stoics with Aristotle's appreciation of the ethical value of emotions. In short, emotions are understood as judgments in which we affirm that a given item, currently located in a particular situation, possesses an intrinsic worth which makes it indispensable to our well-being (*eudaimonia*). And, given that as humans we are sociable and dependent on the surroundings, in most of the cases emotions are directed at external, uncontrollable goods⁷⁰.

Thus, Nussbaum's theory of emotions corresponds to her Aristotelian understanding of the human condition. This philosophical background determines the main directions of Nussbaum's excursions into contemporary psychology, which she undertakes in her recent publications. On the one hand, Nussbaum's Stoic inspirations are reflected in her interest in cognitive psychology. On the other hand, she develops the Aristotelian theme of human rationality-cum-dependency in the context of the object relations theory. As a result, her moral psychology focuses on the role of emotions in the development of a healthy individual, capable of defining her objectives within the confines of the human condition.

Pluralism and the cultivation of emotions

How can moral psychology thus understood meet the two requirements mentioned above? That is: in what sense is it, in itself, respectful of the pluralism of acceptable doctrines and what explanation does it offer as to the process of cultivating mutual respect between citizens? Here the notion of dignity, which plays the key role in Nussbaum's revised capabilities approach, needs to be introduced. Dignity, Nussbaum argues, is the other side of respect and the very reason why we owe it to each other in the first place⁷¹. Although she embraces the Kantian connotations of this category (dignity implies treating each person as an end in herself), she reinterprets it against the background of her Aristotelian assumptions. Thus, Nussbaum insists that respect for the other person's dignity requires that we allow not only for her agency, but also for the vulnerability inseparably related to human "striving"⁷². Inasmuch as the ability to define a scheme of life goals is the token of agency, the recognition of this type of autonomy has to involve the acknowledgment of human fragility as well. In other words, if respect for diversity follows from respect for dignity

⁷⁰ Eadem, *Therapy*, pp. 316-401, *Upheavals*, pp. 19-88.

⁷¹ M.C. Nussbaum, "Perfectionist Liberalism", pp. 18-33.

⁷² Eadem, "Human Dignity and Political Entitlements", [in:] *Human Dignity and Bioethics. Essays Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics* (https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/human_dignity/chapter14.html. Assessed: July 5 2016). See also: eadem, *Frontiers*, pp. 159-160, *PE*, pp. 118-124.

and the latter presupposes certain understanding of human beings as bearers of inalienable worth, the affirmation of pluralism, too, is rooted in a specific attitude to the human condition.

This is why, as I have suggested, the central theme of Nussbaum's moral psychology is the process of coming to terms with our possibilities and limitations. And since emotions, as judgments about the eudaimonistic value of (usually) external goods, express the sense of vulnerability involved in human agency, their cultivation emerges as the primary task of moral development. The details of Nussbaum's complex account of moral maturation, which she presented in *Upheavals of Thought* and *Political Emotions*, exceed the limits of this paper. However, Nussbaum's basic assumption seems to be that, unless we accept the humanity in ourselves, we will not be able to honour the claims of other human beings. Combining the Kantian idea of radical evil with the notions of narcissism and anthropodenial (which she borrows from psychoanalysis and anthropology, respectively), she argues that the backlash against one's own weaknesses spurs on abusive attitude to others⁷³. Among other things, we are prone to deny other individuals the right to differ. This is because, when dissenting opinions and objectives clash, we are reminded about the limits of our control over surroundings⁷⁴. Hence, a number of emotions serves as a protective measure against this type of insecurity. Disgust, shame, fear or envy – all of these sentiments dehumanise others, thereby undermining the validity of their points of view⁷⁵. In this way, the problematic relationship to the human condition blocks respect for pluralism. Intolerance is – at least partly – motivated by the repressed sense of one's own imperfection⁷⁶.

Outplaying anxieties

Nussbaum emphasises, then, that emotions can express attitudes inimical to pluralism. However, in line with her general assumption about the ethical relevance of emotions, she argues that the only way to combat these tendencies is to substitute them with a different model of responding. In

⁷³ Eadem, *PE*, pp. 161-174.

⁷⁴ Eadem, *Upheavals*, pp. 206-224.

⁷⁵ Eadem, *PE*, pp. 182-191, 320-375. See also: eadem, *Hiding from Humanity*.

⁷⁶ Nussbaum is aware that there are other factors which can block mutual respect between citizens, such as economic rivalry, political struggles, etc. Moreover, we do not always act on individual motives, but are often vulnerable to the pressure of surroundings. Famous psychological experiments, such as those staged by Milgram or Zimbardo, have demonstrated that social factors can exert enormous influence on the behaviour of individuals (eadem, *PE*, pp. 191-198, eadem, *Not for Profit. Why Democracy Needs the Humanities*, Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford 2010, pp. 40-46). However, Nussbaum's argument is that, even if individual moral maturity is not always sufficient, it is nevertheless necessary to prevent radical evil. Hence, societies concerned with the value of respect, cannot focus merely on social engineering and the reduction of economic inequalities, but also have to care for the moral education of their citizens.

other words, another emotional ethos is needed. For, after all, if emotions represent commitments to external goods, it is, arguably, through these judgments that respect for others (as independently valuable, autonomous persons) can be most fully represented⁷⁷.

What is particularly important is that Nussbaum insists on the role of the aesthetic in the process of cultivating emotions. Here, again, her philosophical assumptions receive an interesting psychological elaboration. Nussbaum argues that human beings are capable of experiencing a very special emotion of wonder, which is unique in that it expresses disinterested delight⁷⁸. Therefore, it could be assumed that wonder is that element of emotions in general which is responsible for the judgment about the intrinsic worth of their objects⁷⁹. In the case of interpersonal emotions, the value affirmed through wonder would be dignity. Thus, to recognise another person's dignity would mean to wonder at the worth which she possesses as an end in herself⁸⁰. At the same time, because of its contemplative, awe-like character, wonder shows affinity with aesthetic experience. Hence, Nussbaum links it to natural human curiosity or innate creativity, which such psychologists as Daniel Stern and D.W. Winnicott, respectively, expose⁸¹. Moreover, she adopts Winnicott's idea of play as the best means of cultivating the ability to wonder. Play constitutes an intermediate space – later continued in the world of art, science, religion and other forms of creative living – where we can negotiate with reality the limits of our agency. It is thus the area which enables us to develop innate creativity into a productive form – to suppress the narcissistic longing for perfect control and learn how to contribute to our surroundings instead⁸².

⁷⁷ Eadem, *PE*, pp. 2-11.

⁷⁸ Eadem, *Upheavals*, pp. 54-55, 189, *Not for Profit*, pp. 99-100, *PE*, pp. 173-174

⁷⁹ Nussbaum's moral psychology relies in particular on the emotions of compassion and love. She identifies the former with the painful response to some serious loss which the other person suffers through no fault of her own. In this way, compassion expresses the sense of common human vulnerability (eadem, *PE*, pp. 142-146, *Upheavals*, pp. 304-329). Love, in turn, is the most basic emotion, which, according to Nussbaum, functions as the foundation of moral development. It is only in the context of intimate relationships filled with love, Nussbaum argues, that we can learn to act morally. However, in an immature form, love is susceptible to narcissism and possessiveness. Thus, it has to be carefully cultivated, in particular – by strengthening the element of wonder present in this emotion (eadem, *PE*, pp. 174-177. See also: eadem, *Upheavals*, Part III, pp. 455-714).

⁸⁰ Here I follow Bendik-Keymer's interpretation of the relation between wonder and dignity (J. Bendik-Keymer, "From humans to all forms of life: Nussbaum's transformation of dignity", [in:] F. Comim, M.C. Nussbaum [eds.], *Capabilities, Gender, Equality*, pp. 175-191).

⁸¹ M.C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals*, p. 189.

⁸² For Winnicott's original conception see, primarily: D.W. Winnicott, *Playing and Reality*, Routledge: London and New York 2005 (1971) and "The Development of the Capacity for Concern", [in:] idem, *The Maturation Processes and the Facilitating Environment. Studies in the Theory of Emotional Development*, The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis: London 1965, pp. 73-82. For Nussbaum's use of this conception, see, for example: M.C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals*, pp. 206-237, *PE*, pp. 174-182.

Interestingly, the philosophical roots of this psychological approach to play could be found in the post-Kantian German tradition, namely – in Friedrich Schiller's idea of the play drive. Schiller argued that the play drive constitutes the

Therefore, the category of wonder suggests the two-fold relevance of the aesthetic to the education of emotions – in terms of practical implications and at the conceptual level. Firstly, then, by supporting our ability to wonder, art encourages us to approach the surprising and uncontrollable elements of reality with delight rather than with suspicion. In this way, the aesthetic experience can facilitate the acceptance of human limitations. Secondly, given the similarity between the affirmation of dignity and aesthetic contemplation, art emerges as the medium of communicating respectful images. That is, art offers the possibility to represent particular individuals and groups as dignified human beings, rather than subhuman creatures, potential economic rivals, troublesome migrants, etc.

Educating emotions

Based on these two observations, then, it could be concluded that the role of art in the moral education of emotions consists in supporting the mutual recognition of human agency between citizens. The objective is to help citizens realise what it means to be a human subject and acknowledge the subjectivity of others. This suggests that – from the rich catalogue of examples which Nussbaum provides in her books – the priority should be given to these disciplines which rest on the actual interaction between individuals. For, firstly, inasmuch as the moral psychology of a pluralist approach to justice has to be itself pluralism-sensitive, it should guarantee enough discretion to citizens. Interactive aesthetic experiences, which depend on the initiative of their participants, provide the needed context in which individuals can negotiate values and jointly shape emotional ethos. Secondly, this type of artistic encounters presents citizens with actual, “flesh-and-blood” plurality. Thus, individuals have the chance to overcome their own insecurities and mutual suspicions in real-life situations, during which they have to respond to another person’s agency, but also – can display their own activity.

In *Political Emotions* Nussbaum presents compelling instances of the use of art in the urban space (and the use of the urban space design as an artwork), which prove this point⁸³. Here, the art

essence of the aesthetic. Drawing on Kant’s concept of taste, Schiller argued in turn that the aesthetic mediates between intellect and senses, i.e. the active and the receptive sides of the human condition. Thus, Schiller saw aesthetic experience – and play as its essence – as the key to the harmonious development of human beings (J. Chytry, *The Aesthetic State. A Quest in Modern German Thought*, University of California Press: Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1989, pp. 70-105. Nussbaum not only ascribes a similar role to art, but also explains this quality by the continuity between art and play.

⁸³ It is remarkable that, although Nussbaum refers to different art disciplines in many of her earlier books, it is only in *Political Emotions* that she mentions art in the urban space (and the art of the urban space) for the first time. She cites

in (of) the urban space emerges as an apt example of the intermediate realm of play. Yet more importantly, however, it will be noticed that this model of aesthetic experience resembles Arendt's idea of the public space of appearance. Art-mediated encounters in the urban environment could be seen as an embodiment of this concept⁸⁴. At the same time, they constitute the very element of political reality whose contemporary demise Arendt blamed for the crisis of judgment. For art in (of) the urban space contributes to the cultivation of emotional ethos (*sensus communis*) through the active revelation of political actors, who shape the plurality of the public realm. It is in this sense that Nussbaum's moral psychology (and the model of education based on it) seems to complement her account of taste-like judgment, which she calls perception. Let me, then, conclude by suggesting how these two elements could be fitted in with each other.

Emotions and perception - synthesis

My initial assumption was that, when brought together, perception and moral psychology jointly constitute a model of rationality which features a balanced account of immersion and criticism. Such a synthesis is needed if Nussbaum's project is to be respectful of the pluralism of acceptable doctrines. For to meet this objective, it has to, both, allow for the insightful understanding of possible worldviews and guarantee freedom from the pressure of surroundings. Taste, I have argued, suggests a way of meeting these two requirements. Here, the sense of community (or – *sensus communis*) is both the basis and the rationale for judgments, which, however, contribute to sociability by seeking some kind of universality through the striving for impartiality. Moral psychology and perception follow a similar pattern of mutual exchange.

New York's Central Park, the installations in Millennium Park and the revitalisation of the Hyde Park neighbourhood in Chicago, as well as the restructuring of New Delhi as their counter-example, to demonstrate how important it is to create places of friendly encounters for citizens. She argues that such environment encourages people to venture out of their comfort zones and literally confront – and possibly befriend – the plurality of their co-citizens (M.C. Nussbaum, *PE*, 284-288, 299-301, 328-338, 356-359). Other examples of aesthetic experiences based on interaction, which Nussbaum presents in her recent books, involve Chicago Children's Choir and the use of dance and theatre in Rabindranath Tagore's schools (eadem, *Not for Profit*, pp. 103-116)

⁸⁴ It is also worth to mention the terminological connection between Nussbaum's moral psychology and Arendt's idea of the space of appearance. Namely, in her neo-Stoic theory of emotions, Nussbaum adopts the Stoic idea of emotions as responses to appearances (*phantasmata*), i.e. to the ways in which things in the world present themselves to our senses (eadem, *Upheavals*, pp. 37-42, *Therapy*, pp. 84-86, 374-375). Therefore, it could be assumed that emotions (and in particular – wonder, as the most other-directed of them) make us open to the appearances of co-citizens. In order to develop such potential of emotions, they have to be cultivated in the situations which actually confront us with the activities of others.

On the one hand, then, psychology – and the theory of emotions as the main point of Nussbaum’s account – represent the immersion side of rationality. Nussbaum underlines that, as a potential method of ethical reasoning, perception has to involve respect for the inalienable worth of the other person. Being aesthetic, it should be contemplative, but not objectifying⁸⁵. Thus, whereas the process of perceiving may best be represented by novels⁸⁶, it has to be backed by other, more interactive experiences as well⁸⁷. The latter, I have argued, are necessary for the cultivation of the emotion of wonder, which displays the value of dignity for us. Only with the help of such experiences, then, will perception be truly open to the plurality of claims and perspectives. It is also on this condition that we attempt to imaginatively understand other points of view. If we accept their legitimacy, we are ready to make the effort to learn more about them. Moreover, shared emotional ethos contributes to the background against which practical judgments can be formulated. A rough agreement about the right reasons for compassion or anger constitutes the common foundation, which can be used when seeking (‘courting’) the approval for our verdicts⁸⁸. Thus, emotional ethos functions as the bedrock of *phainomena* – our common-sense beliefs.

On the other hand, perception introduces the necessary critical distance. With regard to emotions, it could be said that the striving for clear perception cools down our sentiments. Whereas emotions may represent enthusiastic affirmation of the other person’s dignity, perception requires that we reassess these commitments. In this way, it can counteract partisanship and narrowness, which, as Nussbaum underlines, emotions are all too often prone to display⁸⁹. Given its dynamic, equilibrium-seeking nature, perception uses insights yielded by sentiments, but it does so reflectively – by constantly comparing it to general principles. Thus, perception is responsible for

⁸⁵ See Nussbaum’s interpretation of the moral development of the characters in *The Golden Bowl* by Henry James – eadem, “Literature and the Moral Imagination”, pp. 149-155.

⁸⁶ See footnote no. 64.

⁸⁷ This interpretation might provide a response to Vasterling’s critical paper on Nussbaum. Vasterling analyses the link between Nussbaum’s cognitive theory of emotions and her interest in literature. She argues that this combination results in “solipsism”, in that emotions are understood as judgments of individual, disembodied minds, which, like novel readers, are not confronted with the actual activities of other people. Interestingly enough, Vasterling juxtaposes Nussbaum’s model with Arendt’s phenomenology, i.e. with her focus on appearances (V. Vasterling, “Cognitive Theory and Phenomenology in Arendt’s and Nussbaum’s Work on Narrative”, *Human Studies*, 30 [2007], pp. 79-95). However, if we allow for the use of other art disciplines in moral education (as Nussbaum seems to be doing in her recent writings), Vasterling’s criticism will be mitigated. The special role of wonder and Nussbaum’s interest in more interactive types of aesthetic experiences contribute to a more receptive, other-oriented picture of emotions than Vasterling attributes to Nussbaum.

⁸⁸ For example, Nussbaum’s catalogue of central capabilities lists the reasons for justified appeals to compassion in public reasoning (M. C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals*, pp. 414-425).

⁸⁹ Eadem, *PE*, pp. 211-219, 315-320, *Not for Profit*, pp. 37-38.

the coherence and justifiability of our judgments, which – at least partly – owe their insightfulness to strong emotions. Such critical alertness also facilitates respect for pluralism. For, although it all but questions the value of particulars, perception maintains attentiveness to ever new concrete experiences. In this way, it prevents unchecked local commitments from dominating and seeks justification for our current beliefs, while also allowing for their revision.

IV Conclusion

Aristotle, Kant, diversity

I have argued, then, that perception and moral psychology can mutually supplement each other, thereby contributing to a pluralism-sensitive model of rationality. The question remains, however, whether this theoretical construct itself is compatible with the diversity of acceptable doctrines. After all, I have argued that the continuity of perception and Nussbaum's moral psychology stems from their likewise Aristotelian foundations. Both of these aspects reflect Nussbaum's idea of human beings as rational animals, whose well-being involves many valuable items dependable on uncontrollable events. In what sense, then, is this general framework respectful towards other philosophical, religious or ethical doctrines?

Here the analogy to the Kantian idea of taste proves instructive again. Namely, the juxtaposition with the Kantian-Arendtian model highlights the dynamic, ever-evolving character of Nussbaum's Aristotelianism. It is true that she offers a conception of rationality related to a rough account of the good. But the main feature of this model of reasoning seems to be – the very process of reasoning itself⁹⁰. Taste operates not so much on the basis of common evaluative beliefs as on the basis of common justificatory procedures. Similarly, Nussbaum's account of rationality primarily models the process of common ethical inquiries. Even if this model does not offer independent foundations for the underlying Aristotelian conception, it demonstrates its inherently pluralist and critical character. Thus, it seems that to adopt the Aristotelian account is to accept the duty to constantly reflect on and check the details of the theory of the good⁹¹. Inasmuch as Nussbaum's

⁹⁰ Likewise, the central element of the good life is the ability to reason about *eudaimonia*, as Nussbaum's insistence on the "architectonic" role of practical reason demonstrates (see, for example, eadem, *HF*, pp. 222-223).

⁹¹ See Nussbaum's polemic with MacIntyre, in which she juxtaposes her flexible understanding of the Aristotelian tradition with MacIntyre's more conservative, quasi-communitarian approach to Aristotle's legacy (eadem, "Recoiling from Reason: Review of Alasdair MacIntyre, »Whose Justice? Which Rationality?«", [in:] eadem, *Philosophical Interventions. Reviews 1986-2011*, Oxford University Press: New York 2012, pp. 53-68)

capabilities catalogue could be seen as its possible formulation, the Aristotelian method reminds us of its “open-ended”, revisable character.

It is in this sense that, as I suggested at the very beginning, the Aristotelian background may strengthen Nussbaum’s pluralist commitments. Although, as compared to political liberalism, Nussbaum asserts more, her philosophical assumptions are flexible, dynamic and capable of allowing for various interpretations. At the same time, these philosophical foundations enable her to address the issue of the bases of mutual respect in greater depth than Rawls did. As a result, her project seems more robust and potentially more stable⁹². If we add to this Nussbaum’s concern for the other dimensions of diversity mentioned above – the plurality of conversion factors and of the incommensurate goods – her conception of rationality will emerge as a convincing supplement to capability approach as a liberal, diversity-sensitive paradigm.

Concluding remarks

My aim in this paper was to elaborate on the connection between the commitment to pluralism and the model of rationality, as they are related within the framework of the capability approach. I began by enumerating the main dimensions of diversity recognised by the paradigm in general and then moved on to analysing how Nussbaum addresses them in her variety of the approach. The issue of balancing immersion with criticism emerged as both central and most problematic. I argued that the proper combination of these aspects is necessary if Nussbaum’s project is to be genuinely respectful towards the plurality of acceptable worldviews. My objective was to demonstrate that it is the aesthetic dimension – understood along the lines of Kant’s idea of taste – that suggests the model of such a synthesis. Hence, I focused on the references to art, which appear all over Nussbaum’s work, and analysed their role in her account of rationality.

By way of a conclusion, it could be observed that the aesthetic motifs are yet more important to Nussbaum’s project than they are usually taken to be. Most often Nussbaum’s remarks about art are analysed in relation to moral education, which, indeed, is the context in which they most explicitly appear. However, I argued that these practical implications could be seen as reflecting more fundamental conceptual assumptions. On the one hand, the aesthetic experience models the

⁹² See: J.M. Alexander, “Social justice...”. See also: S. M. Okin, “Reply”, [in:] J. Cohen, M. Howard, M. C Nussbaum (eds.), *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women*, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey 1999, p. 129. Okin argues that Nussbaum’s insistence on equal liberal education for all citizens both undermines her claim to political liberalism and makes her project an attractive alternative to Rawls’ model.

type of reasoning necessary to assess political reality. On the other hand, the values which constitute the latter – in particular: dignity – show affinity with aesthetic categories. Moreover, Nussbaum’s recent interest in the art in (of) urban space could suggest that her project is compatible with Arendtian political ontology. The political realm is, at least partly, constituted by the essentially aesthetic process of creating and perceiving appearances in the public space. Thus, it could be argued that the reason why the aesthetic experience provides the model for public rationality is that its object – i.e. political reality – is likewise aesthetic.

Obviously, this conclusion reaches out to the contexts usually not associated with the capability approach. My intension, however, was to extend the philosophical background of Nussbaum’s project to new interpretational directions. Possibly, the results could also be applied in the capability framework in general.

References:

Works by Martha C. Nussbaum

- “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics”, [in:] J.E.J. Altham and R. Harrison (eds.), *World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams*, Cambridge University Press, 1999 (1995), pp. 86-131;
- “The Discernment Rests with Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of Private and Public Rationality”, [in:] M. C. Nussbaum, *Love’s Knowledge. Essays on Philosophy and Literature*, Oxford University Press: Oxford 1992 (1990), pp. 54-105;
- The Fragility of Goodness. Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press: New York 2009 (1986);
- Frontiers of Justice Disability, Nationality, Species Membership*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England 2007 (2006);
- Hiding from Humanity. Disgust, Shame, and the Law*, Princeton University Press: Princeton 2004;
- “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism”, *Political Theory*, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 202-246;
- (with A. Sen) “Internal Criticism and Indian Rationalist Traditions”, WIDER Working Paper, WP 30 1987 (<https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/WP30.pdf>. Assessed: June 5 2016);
- “Introduction: Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature”, [in:] M. C. Nussbaum, *Love’s Knowledge. Essays on Philosophy and Literature*, Oxford University Press: Oxford 1992 (1990), pp. 3-53;
- “»Finely Aware and Richly Responsible«: Literature and Moral Imagination”, [in:] M. C. Nussbaum, *Love’s Knowledge. Essays on Philosophy and Literature*, Oxford University Press: Oxford 1992 (1990), pp. 148-167;
- “Human Dignity and Political Entitlements”, [in:] *Human Dignity and Bioethics. Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics* (https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/human_dignity/chapter14.html Assessed: July 5 2016);
- “Love’s Knowledge”, [in:] M. C. Nussbaum, *Love’s Knowledge. Essays on Philosophy and Literature*, Oxford University Press: Oxford 1992 (1990), pp. 261-285;
- “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach”, [in:] M. C. Nussbaum, A. Sen (eds.), *The Quality of Life*, Clarendon Press: Oxford 1993, pp. 242-269;
- Not for Profit. Why Democracy Need the Humanities*, Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford 2010;
- Political Emotions, Why Love Matters for Justice*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England 2013;
- “Perceptive Equilibrium: Literary Theory and Ethical Theory”, [in:] M. C. Nussbaum, *Love’s Knowledge. Essays on Philosophy and Literature*, Oxford University Press: Oxford 1992 (1990), pp. 168-194;

“Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism”, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2011, pp. 3-45;
Poetic Justice. The Literary Imagination and Public Life, Beacon Press: Boston 1995;
 “Political Liberalism and Respect”, *Sats – Nordic Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2003, pp. 25-44;
 “Rawls’s »Political Liberalism«. A Reassessment”, *Ratio Juris*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 1-24;
 “Reading for Life”, [in:] M. C. Nussbaum, *Love’s Knowledge. Essays on Philosophy and Literature*, Oxford University Press: Oxford 1992 (1990), pp. 230-244;
 “Recoiling from Reason: Review of Alasdair MacIntyre, »Whose Justice? Which Rationality?«”, [in:] M.C. Nussbaum, *Philosophical Interventions. Reviews 1986-2011*, Oxford University Press: New York 2012, pp. 53-68;
The Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, Princeton University Press: Princeton and Oxford 2009 (1994);
Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions, Cambridge University Press: New York 2008 (2001).

Works by other authors:

Alexander J.M., “Social justice and Nussbaum’s conception of the person”, [in:] F. Comim, M.C. Nussbaum (eds.), *Capabilities, Gender, Equality. Towards Fundamental Entitlements*, Cambridge University Press 2014, pp. 414-436;
 Anderson E., “What Is the Point of Equality”, *Ethics*, Vol. 109, No. 2, pp. 287-337;
 Alkire S., *Valuing Freedoms. Sen’s Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York 2002, pp. 32-41;
 Arendt H., *The Human Condition*, Second Edition, The University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London 1988 (1958);
 Arendt H., *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*, edited by R. Beiner, The University of Chicago Press: Chicago 1992;
 Arendt H., *On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts about Lessing*, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company and Georges Borchardt Inc. 1996 (1968) (<https://signale.cornell.edu/text/humanity-dark-times-thoughts-about-lessing>. Assessed: July 6 2016);
 Beiner R., “Interpretative Essay. Hannah Arendt on Judging”, [in:] H. Arendt, *Lectures*, edited by R. Beiner, pp. 89-156;
 Bendik-Keymer J., “From humans to all forms of life: Nussbaum’s transformation of dignity”, [in] F. Comim, M.C. Nussbaum (eds.), *Capabilities, Gender, Equality*, pp. 175-191;
 Brooks T., “The Capabilities Approach and Political Liberalism”, [in:] T. Brooks, M. C. Nussbaum (eds.), *Rawls’s »Political Liberalism«*, pp. 139-173;
 Chytry J., *The Aesthetic State. A Quest in Modern German Thought*, University of California Press: Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1989;
 Comim F., “Building capabilities: a new paradigm for human development”, [in:] F. Comim, M. C. Nussbaum (eds.), *Capabilities, Gender, Equality. Towards Fundamental Entitlements*, Cambridge University Press 2014, pp. 129-154;
 Hansen P., *Hannah Arendt. Politics, History and Citizenship*, Polity Press: Cambridge 1993;
 James H., *The Art of the Novel*, Charles Scribner’s Sons: New York 1937;
 Kant I., *The Critique of Judgment*, transl. J.H. Bernard, Second Edition Revised, Online Library of Liberty (<http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/kant-the-critique-of-judgement>. Assessed: July 5 2016);
 Kant I., *The Critique of Pure Reason*, transl. P. Guyer, A.W. Wood, Cambridge University Press: New York 1998;
 Larmore Ch., *The Morals of Modernity*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2003 (1996);
 Larmore Ch., *Patterns of Moral Complexity*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, Melbourne, Sydney 2001 (1987);
 Okin S. M., “Reply”, [in:] J. Cohen, M. Howard, M. C Nussbaum (eds.), *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women*, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey 1999, pp. 115-132;
 Passerin D’Entrèves M., “Arendt’s Theory of Judgment”, [in:] D.R. Villa (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2000, pp. 245-260;
 Rawls J., *Political Liberalism*, Columbia University Press: New York 1993, 1996;
 Rawls J., *A Theory of Justice*, Revised Edition, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts 1999 (1971);
 Robeyns I., “Sen’s Capability Approach and Gender Inequality: Selecting Relevant Capabilities”, [in:] I. Robeyns (et alt., eds.), *Amartya Sen’s work and ideas: a gender perspective*, Routledge, London, New York 2005, pp. 63–94;
 Sen A., *Inequality Reexamined*, Russell Sage Foundation: New York, Clarendon Press: Oxford 1992;

Sen A., "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory", *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 317-344;

Smith A., *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Sixth Edition, MetaLibri: Sao Paolo 2005 (1790);

Vasterling V., "Cognitive Theory and Phenomenology in Arendt's and Nussbaum's Work on Narrative", *Human Studies*, 30 (2007), pp. 79-95;

Villa D.R., *Politics, Philosophy, Terror*, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey 1999;

Williams W., *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*, Routledge: London and New York 2006 (1985);

Winnicott D.W., "The Development of the Capacity for Concern", [in:] idem, *The Maturation Processes and the Facilitating Environment. Studies in the Theory of Emotional Development*, The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis: London 1965 pp. 73-82;

Winnicott D.W., *Playing and Reality*, Routledge: London and New York 2005 (1971).